

PROPOSAL PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF PRIVATE
AMERICAN AND JAPANESE INDIVIDUALS ON
APRIL 9, 1941

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our people should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just Peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an entente cordiale, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. We, therefore, suggest that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both governments in honor and in act.

It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a Conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments.

We presume to anticipate that our Governments could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both governments toward the European War.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China affair.
4. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.
5. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.
6. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
7. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.

Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding subject, of course, to modifications by the United States Government and subject to the official and final decision of the Government of Japan.

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

The Governments of the United States and of Japan might jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.

Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments might declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of its Axis Alliance was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the extension of military grouping among nations not directly affected by the European War.

The Government of Japan, with no intention of evading its existing treaty obligations, desires to declare that its military obligation under the Axis Alliance comes into force only when one of the parties of the Alliance is aggressively attacked by a power not at present involved in the European War.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined by no aggressive alliance aimed to assist any one nation against another. The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.

III. China affairs.

The President of the United States, if the following terms are approved by His Excellency and guaranteed by the Government of Japan, might request the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime to negotiate peace with Japan.

- a. Independence of China
- b. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory, in accordance with an agreement to be reached between Japan and China
- c. No acquisition of Chinese territory
- d. No imposition of indemnities
- e. Resumption of the "Open Door"; the interpretation and application of which shall be agreed upon at some future, convenient time between the United States and Japan.
- f. Coalescence of the Governments of Chiang-Kai-Chek and of Wang-Ching-Wei
- g. No large-scale or concentrated immigration of Japanese into Chinese territory
- h. Recognition of Manchukuo.

With the acceptance by the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime of the aforementioned Presidential request, the Japanese Government shall commence direct peace negotiations with the newly coalesced Chinese Government, or constituent elements thereof.

The Government of Japan shall submit to the Chinese concrete terms of peace, within the limits of aforesaid general terms and along the line of neighborly friendship, joint defense against communistic activities and economic cooperation.

Should the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime reject the request of President Roosevelt, the United States Government shall discontinue assistance to the Chinese.

IV. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.

a. As both the Americans and the Japanese are desirous of maintaining the peace in the Pacific, they shall not resort to such disposition of their naval forces and aerial forces as to menace each other. Detailed, concrete agreement thereof shall be left for determination at the proposed joint Conferences.

b. At the conclusion of the projected Conference, each nation might despatch a courtesy naval squadron to visit the country of the other and signalize the new era of Peace in the Pacific.

c. With the first ray of hope for the settlement of Chinese affairs, the Japanese Government will agree, if desired, to use their good offices to release for contract by Americans certain percentage of their total tonnage of merchant vessels, chiefly for the Pacific service, so soon as they can be released from their present commitments. The amount of such tonnage shall be determined at the Conference.

V. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities as are respectively available or required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both governments, it could be elaborated at the proposed conference and concluded in accordance with usual procedure.

For the advancement of economic cooperation between both nations, it is suggested that the United States extend to Japan a gold credit in amounts sufficient to foster trade and industrial development directed to the betterment of Far Eastern economic conditions and to the sustained economic cooperation of the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

VI. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

On the pledged basis of guarantee that Japanese activities in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means, without resorting to arms, American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

VII. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.

A. The Governments of the United States and of Japan will not acquiesce in the future transfer of territories or the relegation of existing States within the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific area to any European Power.

b. The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands and will consider means to come to their assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression by any third Power.

c. The Government of Japan requests the friendly and diplomatic assistance of the Government of the United States for the removal of Hongkong and Singapore as doorways to further political encroachment by the British in the Far East.

d. Japanese Immigration to the United States and to the Southwestern Pacific area shall receive amicable consideration--on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.

Conference.

a. It is suggested that a Conference between Delegates of the United States and of Japan be held at Honolulu and that this conference be opened for the United States by President Roosevelt and for Japan by Prince Konoye. The delegates could number less than five each, exclusive of experts, clerks, etc.

b. There shall be no foreign observers at the Conference.

c. This Conference could be held as soon as possible (May 1941) after the present understanding has been reached.

d. The agenda of the Conference would not include a reconsideration of the present understanding but would direct its efforts to the specification of the prearranged agenda and drafting of instruments to effectuate the understanding. The precise agenda could be determined upon by mutual agreement between both governments.

Addendum.

The present understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.

Foreign Relations II, pp.398-402

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一九四二年/昭和十六年/四月九日 私人タル米國人
及日本人、個人ヲ通ジテ 國務省ニ提出セラ
レタル提案。

米政府及日本政府ハ兩國間、傳統的友好關係
ノ再開ヲ取極メル全般的協定、開始及締結ニ関
シ共同責任ヲ負フモノデアル。

近時兩國間ヲ疎遠ナラシメタル特殊原因ニ關係ナリ
兩國政府ハ兩國間、友好的感情ヲ惡化セシメタル諸
事件、再発ヲ防止シ、予見ミ得サル且不幸ナル結果
ヲ招カザル如ク匡正スベキコトヲ衷心ヨリ希望ス。

共同、協力ニ依リ我々 國民ガ太平洋ニ於テ公正
ナル平和ヲ確立シ、且協商ノ速カナル完成ニ依リ今
文明ニ危殆ニ陥レシメタル悲劇的混亂ヲ消散
セズトモ阻止スルコトハ我々、當面ノ希望デアル。

斯ル決定的措置、爲ニ交渉、遲延、不通ニシテ
消極的デアル。從ツテ我々ハ、今ニ兩國政府ヲ德義
上及行動上拘束スル全般的了解ヲ遂ゲルニ充分ナル方
便ガ講ぜラレシコトヲ提議ス。

我々ハ斯ル了解ガ緊急ナル重要問題、ミテ含ミ、後
日會議ニ於テ審議可能デアリ且夫々、政府ニ依リ適
宜ニ確認可能、サニ義的問題ヲ含マザルモノト信ズ。
我々ハ若シ或種ノ態並ニ態度ガ鮮明セラレ又ハ改
善セシムルニバ我々、政府ガ融和的關係ニ到達シ得ベ

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ニト期待スルモ、デアル。即チ

一、米國及び日本、實際關係及び國家、性格ニ関スル概念

二、歐洲、戦争ニ対スル兩政府、態度

三、日華事變ニ対スル兩主ノ關係

四、太平洋ニ於ケル海軍、航空及び商船關係

五、兩國官、通商及び金融的協力

六、西南太平洋ニ於ケル兩國、經濟活動

七、太平洋ニ於ケル政治的安定ニ影響アル兩主、政策

故ニ我々、次、如キ相互的了解ヲ遂ゲル。勿論是、米國政府ニ依リ修正セリ。又日本政府、正式且最終的決定ヲ受クルモノトス。

一、米主及び日本、實際關係並ニ主、性格ニ關スル概念

米主政府及び日本政府ハ各々平等ナル主權ヲ有

アリ。太平洋ニ於ケル隣接ニテアルコトヲ共同ニ認む。

兩主政府ハ兩國國家が永久平和、確立並ニ兩主民

間、尊敬の信頼及び協力、新時代、創設ニ指向

セリテ居ルコトニ就キ完全ナル意見、一致ヲ確言ス。

兩主政府ハ主及ビ民族が家庭、各負、如ク一家

ヲ構成ス。平和的手段ニ依リ規律セリ且他人、爲ニ

モミテ害スベカラザルカ如ク彼等自身、爲ニモ道德

的物質的福祉、追求ニ向ケリテ居ル。

利害、相互關係ヲ以テ各自が平等ニ權利ヲ享有シ

責任ヲ認メルト云フハ兩主政府、傳統的ニテ現在

ニ於テモ變リナキ概念アリ又確信ナルコトヲ宣言ス。

No 2.

二.

兩玉政府ハ其ノ性格、社会、秩序、並ニ民生
治ノ基礎タル道義ニ據スル夫々ノ傳統的概念ハ
依然トシテ保存セラル是等ノ道義及ビ概念ト相容
シサル外来思想又ハ「イデオロギ」ニ依リ些カモ変更
セシザルニトニ就キ確キタル決意ヲ有スル。

歐洲戦争ニ対スル兩玉政府、態ニ

日本政府ハ樞軸同盟ノ目的ガ所衛的ナリニト
且現在ニ於テモ同様ナリト又歐洲戦争、直接影
響ヲ受ケ居ラザル玉々ノ軍事的集團化、拡大ヲ
防止セシガ爲ナルコトヲ主張スル。

日本政府ハ現存スル條約上ノ義務ヲ回避スル意圖
ナク樞軸同盟ニ依ル日本政府ノ軍事的義務ハ加盟
玉、或一玉ハ歐洲戦争ニ現在關係ナクモ依リ攻
勢的ニ攻撃セシタル場合ニミ効力ヲ発スルモノナ
リトヲ宣言セシト欲スル。

米玉政府ハ米玉政府、歐洲戦争ニ対スル態度ハ他
玉ニ對シ或一玉ヲ援助スル目的ヲ有スル攻勢的
同盟ニ依リ現在ニ於テモ又將來ニ於テモ決ニ決定
セラルコトヲ主張スル。米玉ハ米玉ハ戦争ノ憎悪
ヲ誓言約ニテ居ルコトヲ主張スル。從ツテ歐洲戦争上
對スル米玉ノ態ハ寧ラ自玉ノ福祉及ビ安全ノ保
護的所衛ヲ目的トスル考慮ニ依リ、ミ現在ニ於
テモ又將來ニ於テモ決セシルモノナリ。

No 3

三 日華事変後

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若し左記ノ條件が閣下ニ依リ承認セラレ且日本政
府ニ依リ保證セラレタ場合ニハ米大統領ハ蔣介石政
權ニ對シ日本トノ平和ヲ交渉スベキコトヲ要請スベシ。

イ、中玉ノ獨立

ロ、日本、中玉官ニ締結セラレベキ協定ニ從ヒ日本軍隊、
中玉領土ヨリ撤退

ハ、中玉ノ領土ヲ獲得セザルコト

ニ、賠償ヲ課セザルコト

ホ、門戸開放ノ再開、是、解釈及ビ適用ニ就テハ將來
適當ナル時機ニ於テ日米官ニ協定スベシ

ヘ、蔣介石政權及ビ王精衛政權ノ合作

ト、中玉領土ニ對シ日本移民が大规模ニ且集中的ニ移
住セザルコト

キ、滿洲玉ノ承認

大統領、前記要請ヲ蔣介石政權が承諾シタ場合、日
本政府ハ新ニ合體シタ中國政府スリ、構成機關ト直接交渉ヲ開始スベシ。

日本政府ハ中玉ニ對シ前記、全般的條件ノ範圍
内並ニ善隣友好、共產主義、活動ニ對スル防衛
及ビ經濟的協力、線ニ從ヒ具體的條件ヲ提出スベシ。
若シモ蔣介石政權がこれスベトシ大統領、要請ヲ
拒否セル場合ニハ米玉政府ハ中玉ニ對スル援助ヲ停止
スベシ

四、太平洋ニ於ケル海軍航空、並ニ商船乗保

イ、米玉人及ビ日本人ハ双方共太平洋ニ於ケル平和維

持ヲ欲スルが故ニ彼等ハ互ニ相手ヨリ脅威スル也
キ海軍及ビ空軍ノ配備ヲ為サザンベシ是ニ對スル詳
細ナル具體的協定ハ提議セラルル共同會議ニ於
テ決定セラルベシ。

2. 計畫セラルタ會議ノ終了後兩玉ハ太平洋ニ於ケル平和
ノ新時代ヲ特記スル為メ儀禮的艦隊ヲ夫々相手
玉ニ派遣スベシ。

ハ支那ノ邊解決、オ一曙光が見エタ時日本政府ハ
若シ米玉が欲スルナラバ日本ノ所有スル船舶ノ噸
數ノ分割カラ主トシテ太平洋ニ運航スル米玉人
が契約出来ル様解放セシムルヲ是等ノ船舶
が現在ノ契約カラ解放出来次第斡旋スルコトヲ約
ス。右ニ對スル噸數ハ會議ニ於テ決定セラルベシ。

3. 兩玉間ノ通商及ビ金融的協力

本了解ニ對シ兩玉政府ハ公式承認アリタム時ニハ米玉
及ビ日本ハ夫々が保有シ且兩玉ノ孰シカが必要トスル物
質ヲ相互ニ供給スベキコトヲ確約スル。更ニ兩玉政
府ハ以テ日米通商及ビ航術條約ニヨリ確立セ
ラレシ通常ノ貿易關係ヲ再開スルニ必要ナル手段
ヲ講ズルコトニ同意スル。兩玉政府ハ新通商條約
ヲ希望スル時ハ是ハ提議セラルタ會議ニ於テ仕上
ル通常ノ手續ニ依リ締結シ得ベシ。

兩玉官ノ經濟的協力ヲ促進スル為ニ米玉ハ日本ニ
對シ極東ニ於ケル經濟狀態ノ改善及ビ日米兩玉政府

ノ不断、経済的協力ニ向ケ、レハ貿易及ビ産業ノ発展ヲ促進スル爲ニ必要ナル金額ニ達スル金ノ「クレジット」ヲ與ヘルコトヲ提議スル。

六、西南太平洋ニ於ケル兩玉、経済活動西南太平洋ニ於ケル同本、活動が平和的手段ニ依リ遂行セラレルベシト、誓約保證、下ニ米玉、日本、必要トスル天然資源（例ヘバ油、ゴム、錫、ニッケル等）、生産及ビ獲得ニ協力及ビ援助スベシ。

七、太平洋ニ於ケル政治的安定ニ影響アル西玉政策

イ、米國政府及ビ日本政府、將來極東及ビ西南太平洋ニ於ケル領土、讓渡又ハ現存玉家、歐洲諸國へ、帰属ヲ默認セザルベシ。

ロ、米國政府及ビ日本政府、フィリピンノ群島、獨立ヲ共同ニ保證ス。且チ三者ニ依リ挑発セザル侵略、場合、同群島ヲ援助スル手段ヲ講ズベシ。

ハ、日本政府ハ英玉、東亞ニ對スル是以上ノ政治的侵略、爲、人口トミテ、香港及ビ「マカオ」ヲ排除去スルコトニ對シ米玉政府、好意的且外交的援助ヲ要請スル。

ニ、米玉及ビ西南太平洋地域へ、日本移民ニ就テハ他玉民ト平等ニミテ差別ナキ基礎、下ニ友誼的考慮が與ヘラレベシ。

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會議

1. 米國及日本、代表、會議ヲ「ホ、ル」ニ開催シ、此、會議ハ米玉側ハ「ルーズベルト」大統領、日本側ハ近衛公ニ依リ開カレルコトヲ提議スル。代表、數、専門、存、復、及、ビ、る、務、負、ヲ、除、キ、各、五、名、以、下、ト、ス。
2. 會議ニ、代、玉、「オブザ、テア、ー」、ノ、列、席、ヲ、許、サ、ズ
- ハ、本、會、議、ハ、本、了、解、ガ、遂、ゲ、ラ、レ、ル、次、第、(一九四一年昭和十六年/五月)開催ニ得ベシ
- ニ、會、議、ノ、議、題、ハ、本、了、解、ノ、再、考、ヲ、含、マ、ズ、豫、メ、打、合、セ、ル、議、題、ノ、明、記、並、ニ、了、解、ヲ、有、効、化、ス、ル、為、メ、手、段、ノ、起、草、ニ、努、力、ガ、向、テ、ラ、レ、ル。以、確、カ、ル、議、題、ハ、兩、玉、政、府、ノ、合、意、ニ、依、リ、決、定、ニ、得、ベ、シ。

追加

- 本了解ハ米玉政府及日本政府官、秘密賢書トシニ保存セラルベシ
- 本了解、発表、ノ、範圍、性、格、及、ビ、時期、ハ、兩、玉、政、府、ニ、ヨ、リ、決、定、セ、ラ、レ、ル、ベ、シ

外交關係 Ⅱ 四九八—五〇二頁

NO 7

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(WASHINGTON,) April 14, 1941

Excerpt.

The Ambassador of Japan called at my apartment at the Wardman Park Hotel at my request. I stated that as the Ambassador would recall, both the President and I suggested during our conversations with him that he might care in discussions with me to explore the question of improving relations between the United States and Japan; that such a procedure might involve a review of relations during recent years in an attempt to ascertain where and in what respects the courses of the two countries had diverged; and that this would be done with a view to ascertaining whether something practicable might be done toward restoring the relations of our two countries to that harmonious state which existed for so many decades. I said that I referred to this again at this time because of the reports which have been coming to me that certain of the Ambassador's compatriots have been working on formulation of proposals and plans for improving relations between the United States and Japan. I had been told that the Ambassador's compatriots have been in touch with the Ambassador in connection with their proposals and that the Ambassador has participated in and associated himself with these plans. I added that I did, of course, not know whether these reports are entirely accurate and, as mentioned previously to him, we can deal only with the Ambassador in addressing ourselves to consideration of problems outstanding between our two Governments.

I then emphasized the point that I had sent for the Ambassador primarily to clear up the matter of the extent of his knowledge of the latest document handed to my associates in the State Department by those Americans and Japanese who are collaborating as individuals in an effort to make some sort of contribution to better relations between the two countries, and as to whether it was his desire to present that officially as a first step in negotiations between the two Governments. I again cited those phases previously referred to, which called for preliminary conversation on certain subjects before a stage of negotiations could be reached, and which discouraged the immediate presentation of the document by the Ambassador in an official way. The Ambassador promptly replied that he did know all about this document and that he had collaborated more or less with the individual Japanese and Americans referred to, and that he would be disposed to present it as a basis for negotiations. He proceeded to refer to his great desire to preserve peace between the two countries and therefore to do anything within his power to that end. He emphasized the utter disaster it would be to both countries to go to war, which would last perhaps for many years with the complete exhaustion of all concerned. He spoke strongly expressing the view that his Government did not intend to invade the South Sea area.

. Foreign Relations II, pp.402- 403

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國務長官ノ電書

「ワシントン」ニテ一九四二年(昭和十七年)四月五日發

日本大使ハ余、懇談ニ應ジテ「ワードマン・パークホテル」ニ余ノ部屋ヲ訪シタ。余ハ次、如ク彼ニ語ッタ。
即チ大使ガ記憶セラルル如ク大使トノ會談中、文統
領及ビ余ハ日米關係改善ノ問題ヲ大使ガ余ト、協議
ニ於テ探究シテハ如何ト提議シタト。而シテ斯カル
方法ハ兩國ノ進路ガ何処ニ於テ又如何ナル其ニ於テ
分歧シタカラ確タル爲ニ最近ニ於テ何モ關係檢討
ヲ會合セザラズ。且是ハ兩國關係ニ於テ數十年來
存在シタ睦ニキ狀態ニ引戻ス爲メ何カ更ニ策
ルモ「ガア」ヤ否ヤヲ確タル目的ヲ以テ然ルニテアラ
コトヲ提議シタコトヲ語ッタ。

1. 今亦余ガ是ニ言及スル理由ハ大使、同僚ガ日米
關係改善ノ提議及ビ計畫ヲ明示セント爲カシ、
アル報告ヲ受ケタカラデアル。余ハ大使、同僚ガ彼等ノ
提議ニ關シテ大使ト接觸ヲ保ツテ居リ又大使ハ

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是等、計畫ニ参考之且提携ニト南イタ。余ハ
勿論是等、報告が全ク正確ナルヤ否ヤ、知らズ、且
以テ大使ニ言ハク如ク、両見方、未決問題ヲ検討
スルニ當リ、我方ハ大使ノミヲ相手ニスル外ナシト附言
シタ。

次ニ余ハ大使、來訪ヲホメタヤ、理由ハ兩國關係改
善ニ何カ貢獻セントスル努力ニ協力シツ、アル米國人
及び日本人ニヨリ國務省、余、同僚ニモ交セラシタ事近
ノ文書ニ関シ大使が如何ナル結果承知シテ居ルカ。
又大使ハソレヲ日米兩國政府省、交際ノホト
シテ心算ニ提出セント欲スルモノナリヤ否ヤ明カニ
スルガデアルト強調シタ。余ハ以テ言及シタ諸局
面ヲ再ビ引用シタ。是等、局面ハ交渉開始ニ至ル
迄ニ必要ナル或問題ニ関スル予備會談ヲ必要トシ

2

且大使が右文書ヲ直ニ心算ニ提出スルコトヲ阻止
スルモノデアル。大使ハ右文書、全部ニ関シテ^{承認}され
下。個々ノ日本人並ニ米國人ト、多少少協力ニタコト
且彼ノ是ヲ交渉、基礎トシテ提出シタキ意向デ。

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アト即答シタ。彼ハ西國者、平和ヲ維持シ、ソ、
目的ノ爲ニハカ、及ブ限り盡サントスル彼、大ニ希望
ニ就キ言及シタ。彼ハ若シ西國が干戈ヲ文ニ
至ラバ戦争ハ數年中儘キ双方完全ニ消耗シ大慘
ヲ路ルト強調シタ。彼ハ日本政府ハ南方地域
ニ侵入スル意ヲ持ツト意見ヲ強ク披瀝シタ。

外交関係 卷 四〇二—四〇三頁

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(WASHINGTON,) April 16, 1941

Excerpt.

.....

With reference to the question of gradually developing a settlement in the Orient, I said that I had been told that the document on which the Ambassador and the private group of individual Americans and Japanese were collaborating contained numerous proposals with which my Government could readily agree; on the other hand, however, there were others that would require modification, expansion, or entire elimination, and, in addition, there would naturally be some new and separate suggestions by this Government for consideration. I then remarked that the one paramount preliminary question about which my Government is concerned is a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government has the willingness and ability to go forward with a plan along the lines of the document we have referred to and the points brought up in our conversation in relation to the problems of a settlement; to abandon its present doctrine of military conquest by force and the taking of title to all property and territories seized, together with the use of force as an instrument of policy; and to adopt the principles which this Government has been proclaiming and practicing as embodying the foundation on which all relations between nations should properly rest.

I said:

"I will, therefore, hand to you as the basis for my preliminary question, the following four points on a blank piece of paper:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

"You can answer the questions or submit them to your Government for its answer through you, as you prefer. You understand that we both agree that we have in no sense reached the stage of negotiations; that we are only exploring in a purely preliminary and unofficial way what action might pave the way for negotiations later.

.....

EX 1061

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國務長官覚書

(フニントニ)一九四四年(昭和十九年)四月十六日 板井

東洋に解決を漸進的にもち出す問題に關し、
私は大使や個々のアメリカ人と日本人との私的関係が
会作中の文書が我が政府が然るに同意出来る
提案を多く含んで居ると聞かされて居るが、他面
修正や拡張や全面的削除を要する提案もあり。
更に合衆見政府は勿論或る形に別個の提案を
考慮の爲持たせて居るであらうと語る。次に私は
合衆見政府が関心を抱つてゐる一つの非常に重大な予
備的問題は日本政府が予記文書及び解決の諸問
題に關する吾々の会談に於て言及せられた点に
対し計画を押進する。現在の武力による軍事的
征服主義と政策の手段としての武力行使と共に
奪取せる凡ての財産と領土とに対する権利を取得す
る事を放棄する事。又國府が凡ての關係が當然
立脚すべき基礎を具現する事として合衆見政府が

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宣言に実行してゐる主義を採用する事等を快く爲し且実行し得る能力を有する事を以ての自由な保証である。私は次の如く言つた。

「私は先づ故私の準備の問題の基礎として白紙に次の四点を書き貴君に送交する

- 一、各國及び他國の領土保全と主權の尊重
- 二、他國の國內紛争に対する不干渉主義の支持
- 三、通商上の機會均等を含む均等主義の支持
- 四、平和的手段による現状変更以外太平洋に於ける現状の不擾乱

「貴君は貴君の好む所に依り、この問題に答へるか又は貴君を通じてその解答を得るために日本政府へお提出されたい。貴君は五里が如何なる意味に於ける交渉の段階に到達しを豫めたいと云ふ。又貴君は如何なる行為が爾後の交渉を容易ならしめるかを必然なる準備的公平の方法を以て探求し得るのみであるといふ事を明し、且々二人の意見が一致し得るといふ事を明了解されたい。 外交関係四〇六—四〇七頁